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The disastrous defeats suffered in the Second Balkan War (June 29, 1913-August 10, 
1913), and especially, in the First World War, left Bulgaria with a series of unresolved social, 
political, and economic issues. In the aftermath of WW I and following, the abdication of 
King Ferdinand I in favor of his son Boris III, the failed process of national unification, 
combined with the harsh requirements established by the Neuilly-sur-Seine peace treaty, in 
November 1919, produced a traumatic impact on a country that was experiencing a crucial 
soul-searching moment in its history. Amid growing social discontent, the political election 
held in 1919 sanctioned the triumph of the parties that had firmly opposed Bulgaria’s entry 
into WW I on the Central Powers side: the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) and 
the Bulgarian Communist Party.  
By March 1920, the Agrarian Party and its undisputed and controversial leader 
Alexander Stamboliiski, who was elected prime minister, ruled the country with an absolute 
majority of deputies.  
In order to establish a new agrarian society, Stamboliiski’s program aimed to divide 
up large landed estates and create a new class of peasants proprietors; a society “dominated 
by tidy, modernized villages with paved streets, clean waters, proper sanitation, good schools, 
adequate libraries, and cinemas.”1  
Despite attaining some remarkable achievements, the establishing of a nearly utopian 
agrarian society was hindered in many ways: the payment of relevant war reparations, both in 
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kind and in good; the slowness of the process of land redistribution; a growing level of 
corruption within the BANU rank and file; and finally, the solid opposition from all other 
Bulgarian political and social forces—the throne, the church, and the army included—all 
were factors which weakened Stamboliiski’s radical process of reforming the Bulgarian 
society. However, after BANU’s controversial electoral triumph in April 1923, it was a 
conspiracy organized by the members of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization (IMRO) that put a dramatic end to the Stamboliiski’s experience.  
Macedonian extremists were particularly enraged by the Treaty of Nish signed by 
Stamboliiski with Yugoslavia in March 1923 that had started off as an agreement of 
cooperation between the two countries in order to prevent IMRO terrorist raids from the 
southwestern Bulgarian region of Petrich into Greece and Yugoslav Macedonia.  With the 
tacit assent of the king, the support of the army, the approval of a large political coalition, and 
with the Communist party refusing to take any initiative, the government was overthrown, 
and Stamboliiski brutally assassinated.  Alexander Tsankov, a professor of political economy 
at Sofia University, became the new prime minister, leading a motley coalition, the 
Democratic Alliance.  
This was the turbulent political scenario that Dr. Selskar M. Gunn, director of the 
Paris Office of the International Health Board (IHB) of the Rockefeller Foundation (RF), 
found when he arrived in Bulgaria, on February 26, 1923.  In a letter addressed to Frederick 
F. Russell, the new general director of the IHB, Gunn explained the reason for his trip to the 
Balkan country, and how the IHB came in contact with the Bulgarian authorities. In 
November 1921, Gunn had met Professor Beron, a Bulgarian doctor, in Prague who “wished 
to know whether or not it would be possible for the International Health Board to assist 
Bulgaria. I informed him that it would be advisable for the Government to make an official 
request.”2  
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Such a request was forwarded by Dr. Georgieff, Director of the National Public 
Health Service, on April 12, 1922. At this point, Gunn was authorized by Wickliffe Rose, 
then general director of the IHB, “to go to Bulgaria any time within the next twelve months.” 
Meanwhile, in December, another request was sent to the RF through the American Minister 
in Sofia by Prime Minister Stamboliiski. Gunn’s presence in Bulgaria lasted about three 
weeks, from February 26 to March 16. Upon his return to Paris, he sent a detailed report to 
New York describing not only the sanitary situation of the country, but also giving an 
overview of Bulgarian society at large.
3
  
According to Gunn, Bulgaria was “one of the few countries defeated in the war, 
which thoroughly realizes its defeat.” Drawn into an unpopular war by Czar Ferdinand and 
his ministers, “the country finds itself deprived of considerable territory, including Thrace 
and its port on the Aegean Sea, saddled with an enormous reparation amounting to two and a 
quarter billion of French gold francs, with no friends in the world, and one cannot be 
surprised that one encounters frequently more or less blank despair.” From a demographic 
perspective, the war left another heavy burden. According to the 1921 census, the population 
of Bulgaria was about five million, but since then, a large number of refugees arrived in the 
country. “It is estimated, Gunn writes, “that 500,000 Bulgarian refugees have been driven out 
of Thrace by the Greeks. In addition there are over 50,000 Russian refugees, and large 
numbers of Armenians and others who have come from Asia Minor.”4  
Gunn’s opinion of Stamboliiski’s political conduct was particularly cautious, although 
he was “generally credited with having saved the country from bolshevism in 1919.” His 
authoritarian conduct may have found justification, if not approval, in the demand coming 
from the Bulgarian people, the peasants especially, for “retribution on the heads of those 
who, in their lights, had rendered an almost irreparable wrong to the country,” by involving it 
in the Second Balkan War and in the Great War. The intricate Macedonian question did not 
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fail to attract Gunn’s attention; noting that “Stambuliiski’s life has been in danger from 
Macedonians,” he rightly anticipated the imminent tragic end of the agrarian leader.  
The idea of a future Slavic Confederation, strongly supported by Stambuliiski, which 
would include Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Montenegro, would bring 
in Gunn’s opinion, and many advantages; but at the moment, such a solution, because it 
required “great statesmanship,” was not viable.  
If instability was the key word in Bulgarian political affairs,
5
 then Gunn’s analysis 
showed that the health conditions in the country, the general organization of the public health 
system, and its administration were problematic too. Although the Bulgarian Ministry of 
Interior and Public Health had recently multiplied its efforts, “it will be remarked that this 
organization of activities under the National Service is not modern.” Most of the existing 
structures, such as the State Hygienic Institute or the State Bacteriological Institute in Sofia, 
required an updated plan of renovation. Besides, just because “the interest was swinging 
more and more to really preventive medicine” rather than “Hospitals and Pharmacies,” there 
was a growing need of men who might have “the benefit of training in Public Health work.” 
The situation of the medical and sanitary personnel was rather worrisome. The large 
majority of the approximately eight hundred Bulgarian physicians, “all of whom received 
their education in foreign countries,” worked in the major urban centers, and for this reason 
there were many areas without medical assistance. Bulgaria, “on account of its lack of 
medical men,” was forced years to adopt the Russian system and “create a corps of medical 
assistants or feldschers.” Considered as “a necessary evil,” the feldschers, after a rudimentary 
training, provided basic health assistance in rural Bulgaria. “In the village he not only acts as 
a local health officer, but practices medicine within certain limits.” Their number grew after 
the war—to approximately two thousand—but unfortunately the school dedicated to their 
education was closed, and since then the selection process had became “a farce.” 
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Nevertheless, the “feldschers have a very much stronger position in the country than the 
doctor,” and they are also “stated to be active politically.” 
In the second part of his report, Gunn gave a dramatic account of the situation 
concerning “the acute and chronic infectious diseases” affecting Bulgaria. In spite of many 
difficulties, the amount of work done by the Division of Infectious Diseases “is not 
inconsiderable today and it seems to be only a question of time and money before the service 
will be really organized in a first-class manner.”6 
Under the direction of Doctor Golosmanoff, a system of collecting reports from local 
health officers in different areas of the country was organized so that a screening of all 
communicable diseases became possible.
7
 
Measles, scarlet fever, influenza, mumps, typhoid fever, and whooping cough were 
among those most commonly reported. Malaria, according to Gunn and without a doubt, 
represented “one of the most serious public health problems of the country.” The Bulgarian 
government, Gunn noted, had activated some measures in order to contain the spread of the 
disease:  
The situation was bad before the war, but the war caused a wider spread of malaria 
and also introduced, to a considerable extent, the tropical form of the disease, which 
was very rare prior to the war. The government passed a special law in 1919 looking 
towards the control of malaria through the National Public Health Service under the 
Chief of the Bureau of Infectious Diseases. There was a General Inspector for 
Malaria, as well as a Special Committee of Experts attached to the Ministry that aided 
in the development of an Anti-Malarial Campaign. 
 
To complicate things, by malaria not being “a reportable disease,” the statistics therefore 
might represent only the cases treated in public institutions; nevertheless, these cases alone 
“show a morbidity rate of 11.7 per thousand in 1921.” In some departments—Bulgaria was 
then divided into fifteen departments—with Varna, for example, this figure reached an  
impressive rate of 40.61 per thousand. A special study conducted in 1921 revealed that only a 
few districts were not hit by malaria. In large cities such as Bourgas, “between thirty and 
 6 
forty percent of all persons who come to the municipal dispensaries for treatment come 
because they are suffering from malaria.”8 
In order to face this critical situation, the Bulgarian government had already appointed 
six malaria inspectors dedicated full time to conduct surveys on the disease in the most at risk 
districts. Each inspector “has a microscopist attached to him and the microscopist has a small 
laboratory located in a hospital in the district.” Also, a regular free distribution of quinine had 
been organized, usually by a feldscher. The same feldschers were also in charge of taking 
blood samples to be analyzed by the microscopist who referred the results of the 
examinations to the distributors.  
All ten districts declared “infected” by the National Public Health Service had to 
contribute “five percent of their total budget to a so-called Malaria Fund.” In the areas 
surrounding Varna, Bourgas, and Plovdiv, the government concentrated its efforts by 
undertaking some very large drainage programs. According to Gunn however, this project “is 
somewhat out of proportion when one considers the cost involved.” The same amount of 
money, in fact, might have been spent more usefully in a larger number of communities, 
giving aid to a much larger population.  
However, despite all the good intentions, some aspects of the struggle against malaria 
remained quite naïve. The Malaria Law, for example, required that, in the infected districts, 
some preventive measures such as oiling, ditching, and draining were carried out by the 
people living in the community.
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 As a matter of fact, “the oiling is usually done by 
schoolchildren, and prizes are given to schools where the children are particularly active in 
abating nuisances which would permit the breeding of mosquitoes.” For sure, a more 
satisfying organization of the oiling operations might come from the employment of so-called 
trudovacks.  
 7 
The end of the war brought about the abolition of conscription. In order to bring 
together the different social classes of the country, Stamboliiski presented to the Parliament a 
project which reshaped an already existing Compulsory Labor Law. This law required all 
men between twenty and forty to work a total of six months for the government, while 
unmarried females between the ages of sixteen and thirty were required to work four months. 
The greater part of this labor service was “in connection with the building of roads, railroads, 
school-houses, and other public buildings, draining marshes etc.” Thanks to this law a great 
deal of labor “in connection with the suppression of malaria is done by ‘trudovacks.’”10 
At the end of his sojourn, Gunn was ready to forward some recommendations to the 
IHB in New York. Bulgaria, a small country, about the size of Ohio, suffered from the 
disasters caused by a series of wars and “was struggling to get on its feet and the outlook 
seems encouraging.” According to the RF representative, the Agrarian Party was “intensely 
interested in the welfare of the country,” even if it would be unsafe to prognosticate what 
steps its “brilliant and audacious” leader, Stamboliiski, may undertake.  
Turning his attention to the specific purpose of his trip, Gunn admitted that “the 
Public Health organization of the country at the present time leaves much to be desired, but 
progress is to be noted in every direction of health work and considerable credits are voted 
for these purposes.” Numerous were the sanitary deficiencies that required urgent 
interventions.  
In a letter addressed to Gunn, the director of Public Health, Doctor V. Georgieff, had 
summarized them, indicating how the RF might intervene:  
1) Young Bulgarian doctors might be sent abroad at the expense of the RF, to 
specialize for a period of two or three years.  
2) A few higher officials might be sent on a mission to enable them to study hygiene 
and sanitary organization.  
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3) The RF could provide material assistance for the construction of an Institute of 
Hygiene, an essential structure lacking in Bulgaria.  
4) A RF delegate could serve as a technical adviser to the Directory of Public Health. 
5) The organization of a Health Service to collect data in a given Department, during 
a period of several years, in accordance with the methods of the IHB. 
Gunn was in favor of the idea that the RF’s IHB grant to the National Public Health 
Service “a limited number of fellowships,” initially four. He was not equally positive about 
the other proposals, because they involved considerable expenditures of money, better 
planning and a more pondered final decision about what might be taken “for the time being.” 
The request, instead, “to have the Foundation send a temporary delegate to Sofia to act as a 
Technical adviser to the Public Health Service,” was an excellent thing to do. In conclusion, 
Gunn wrote, “I see many reasons why the International Health Board may well include 
Bulgaria at this time in the list of countries in Europe with which it is cooperating.” A 
cooperation, albeit, to be started in a modest way. 
The IHB accepted Gunn’s point of view and, in 1924, four fellowships were granted 
to four Bulgarian doctors: the first to receive one was Kosta Drensky, a well-known 
malariologist.
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 Again following Gunn’s advice, in May 1926 a second notable step was 
made with the IHB’s decision to contribute to the construction of a Central Institute of 
Hygiene or Public Health Laboratory in Sofia.
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  Finally, in 1928, the IHB made its most 
challenging decision: “At its meeting on February 10, 1928 the Executive Committee 
approved Budget N° 64387 for a Field Station in Malaria at Petrich, Bulgaria, for the period 
February 1 to December 31, 1928, amounting to 1,104,000 Levas and appropriated $8,100 
(1,104,000 Levas) to be used in carrying out its provision.”13 
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The plan of establishing a station at Petrich, a town close to the Grecian and Yugoslav 
frontiers, was defined by points on which the IHB and the Bulgarian directory of Hygiene 
had agreed:  
“a) The Foundation will lend a malaria expert to supervise the organization and 
program of the station.  
b) The Direction of hygiene will lend an expert to be charged with the resident 
direction of the station. The personnel is [are] to be Bulgarian.  
c) The government will provide a building as a laboratory and living quarters for 
personnel.  
d) The station shall be considered an integral part of the national malaria service. It 
shall be autonomous in so far as its own program and work is concerned and 
answerable only to the authority of the inspector general of malaria.  
e) The area of Petrich with as many of its surrounding villages as shall be deemed 
desirable shall be allotted to the purpose of the study.  
f) The budget for this station shall be supported by the Foundation alone through that 
period during which the work is distinctly experimental and investigative in nature. 
This period is estimated at three years.”14  
 
Along with Gunn, the great architect of the operation was his Paris Office Assistant, Dr. 
Ralph R. Collins, who had conducted pioneering experiments in quinine treatment in 
Alabama and Georgia, along with the malaria luminary Samuel Taylor Darling.
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 As a matter 
of fact, Collins had joined the European field staff of the IHB in 1926 and was assigned to 
Bulgaria and Turkey.
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The first report drafted by Collins described a difficult situation: “The entire area 
under study, which was the one suffering most acutely at the present time from malaria, lies 
within a radius of twenty-five kilometers of the confluences of the Struma Rivers.” In order 
to better organize the control of the disease, the area was divided in three geographically 
distinct sections comprising seven villages:  
1) Demidovo, Kolarovo  
2) Orman, Shirbamovo and  
3) Marinopole, Tchutchuligovo and Kulata.
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With the arrival in Petrich of the field inspector, Dr. Angel Drenovsky, an expert 
malariologist trained in Germany, the guidelines were immediately set up:  
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“The program of the works of the station as at present conceived consists of the 
following principal items.  
1) Determination of the splenic and parasite indices probably semiannually—April 
and November.  
2) Mapmaking for all villages under routine observation.  
3) Routine catches twice weekly in picked and permanent stations in each village for:    
a) Adult mosquitoes; b) Larvae.  
4) Establishment of the infection rate of the various species of mosquitoes found in 
the area.  
5) Studies of mosquito habits, feeding, etc.  
6) The determination of some specific methods of anti-malaria campaigns to be 
undertaken for each area during the coming year.”18  
 
Despite the many specific difficulties met on the ground, and the political instability that 
characterized Bulgaria in the early 1930s,
19
 Collins and his team obtained considerable 
results in Petrich, in terms both of sanitation of the monitored area, and of data collected 
concerning the modalities of diffusion of the disease.  
In a densely detailed series of annual and quarterly reports forwarded to the IHB, rich 
with tables, statistics and often photos, Collins documented all the initiatives carried out by 
the Petrich Malaria Station. These reports contained a vast range of components, from blood 
and spleen indexes examinations over the district population to quinine distribution; from 
mosquitoes catching, classification, and dissection to Paris Green spraying operations; and 
from rice fields watering control to bridges and canals construction. A great deal of data is 
reported and sometimes faced failures, as well as the many changes introduced during the 
experiment. At the end of a decennial experience, Collins was able to outline a final balance 
marked by undisputable successes.
20
  
In his final report on the Petrich Malaria Station experiment, Collins describes how, in 
the spring of 1928, after the IHB involvement in the project that “a nucleus staff for the new 
Station [has] been selected, the building was begun and the preliminary surveys of the area 
were undertaken.”21 The history of the station can be divided into four distinct periods: From 
1928 to 1930, most of the work was dedicated to preliminary observations of a demographic, 
sanitary, topographical, and meteorological nature. In the second period, from 1930 to 1935, 
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after examinations made on school children revealed that the area had a “degree of infection 
perhaps greater than that encountered in any other part of the country,” an anti-larva program 
was started.  
In order to better understand the dynamics of the spread of malaria, “a decision had 
been taken to divide the district into three zones. One of these zones having in it two villages 
was to serve as a comparison or control zone. The other two zones containing five villages 
were to form the protected or experimental area.”  
At the same time, a great deal of drainage works were executed, thanks to the arrival 
of Frederick W. Knipe, an American malaria-control engineer working in the Balkans for the 
RF.
22
 This led “to decreasing the vast areas of marsh and swamp land which had proven too 
extensive for control by simply Paris-Greening.” As Collins clearly pointed out:  
“The effort to control the vast amount of waste and irrigation water in the protected 
area has been the principal interest of this experiment. Without a concerted program 
directed to the permanent elimination of as many as possible of these anopheline 
breeding areas as anti-larva program based solely upon temporary measures of 
greening, oiling, etc., would have been not only physically impossible, but far beyond 
the ability of the community to support.”  
 
The greatest share in the performance of the drainage work was born by the Trudovacs Labor 
Corps, permanently assigned to the Station.  
From 1935, the RF’s local representative was withdrawn from active participation in 
the conduct of the Station’s activities, so the routine procedures were carried out by the local 
district health officers. The final period begins in 1938, when the RF support ceased and the 
Station’s budget was provided entirely by the national government. 
In the end, the field experiment in malaria control based on anti-larva methods 
covering the entire valley area, for fifteen miles, along the Strumitza and Struma Rivers, and 
involving a population of some 16,000, gave more than encouraging outcomes and possibly a 
lesson: “With Trudovac labor and competent engineering and technical guidance, 
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government could today establish a ten year plan for malaria control by antilarva methods 
with almost complete assurances of as great or greater success than that obtained at Petrich.” 
Another source, a letter addressed to Collins signed both by Roussi Radkoff, Director of 
Health, and Kosta Drensky, Chief Malariologist, summarized in a very eloquent way the 
activities carried out during this period:  
You know that in Petrich, with the means of the Rockefeller Foundation was 
organized the fight against malaria, which went on for a period of ten years. The 
results of the work are more than satisfactory. The cases of malaria found at first to be 
from seventy to eighty percent of the population, was brought down to ten to twelve 
percent. About 20,000 decars of swamps and damp places, which before were seats of 
malaria, were made healthy, and now they are the most fertile pieces of land and 
sources of welfare for the population. The achievement of sanitary and economic 
point[s] of view are [were] great. A population of about 16,000 was saved from 
hunger and degeneration.
23
 
 
 The Bulgarian people realized and highly appreciated what the RF had done for them. 
In fact, in Petrich, one street was named for Mr. Rockefeller and another for Dr. Collins, and 
the village school in Topolnitza, bears the name of Dr. Collins—all in an expression of 
gratitude and recognition. 
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